د عدلي الهواري

It was suggested in my previous essay that the Camp David Accords were not the original goal of the American foreign policy toward the Middle East during President Carter’s administration. The objective was a multilateral, comprehensive peace, formalized in the Geneva Conference under joint American-Soviet chairmanship. Settling for a bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel, and leaving the Palestinian question unresolved could be best explained by looking at the American policy at the time from a perspective of East-West rivalry in one of the important regions of the world. I would be, therefore, one of those who subscribe to the broadest definition of the Cold War, i.e., the East-West rivalry in any part of the world.

One should point out first to the initial approach of the Carter’s administration toward achieving peace in the Middle East, including finding a solution to the Palestinian question, and then move on to explain why this approach was abandoned.

There was agreement among Carter’s advisers that the administration should attempt to achieve comprehensive, multilateral peace, i.e., one between Israel and all its neighbors. As far as the Palestinians were concerned, they were to be given a homeland and “some form of self-determination.”[1] There were even attempts to involve the PLO in the peace process.

These attempts centered on a recognition by the PLO of the right of Israel to exist, by accepting UN resolution 242, while expressing reservations that 242 referred to the Palestinians only as refugees.[2]

When it came to the Soviet Union’s role in the process, one could easily identify two schools of thought within the administration. The first was that of Cyrus Vance, secretary of state (1977-1998) who recognized that the Soviet Union had “political interests in the area”[3] and thus should be “accorded a role in the peace process.”[4]

Furthermore, Vance observed that “by any rational calculation the Soviet Union has a fundamental interest in avoiding a confrontation in this pivotal area of the world.”[5]

One should not overlook Vance’s use of the word rational, because it was indicative of his style and approach. In line with this belief, Vance kept the Soviets informed of the American moves, and finally got down to signing a joint statement (on 1 October 1977) with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andre Gromyko, outlining the views of both countries on the goals to be achieved at a Geneva conference.[6] That statement was received with hostility in the USA, and because this point was referred to in some detail in my previous essay, I would re-quote William Safire, The New York Times’ columnist, to point out a popular conception, or rather a misconception, that national liberation movements were necessarily anti-American, pro-Soviet movements.[7]

Safire described the joint statement as a “Carter plan to impose a settlement on Israel, turning the West Bank and Gaza into a Soviet staging area against Israel.”[8] Any involvement of the Soviet Union was unwelcome.

The other school of thought in the administration was that of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s national security adviser, who argued that a Geneva conference should be considered “a concession to the USSR for which the Soviets should make some concession to us.”[9]

While initially the two schools of thought were able to co-exist within the administration, it would appear that the dominant school became Brzezinski’s, especially once the Soviet Union was excluded from the process of reaching a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Other factors helped the ascendancy of Brzezinski’s school of thought, particularly the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran, which was going on more or less at the same of trying to reach a settlement for the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Since Brzezinski’s school of thought became dominant, it would be worthwhile to look at the ingredients of his approach and philosophy. Brzezinski made it clear in his memoirs that he wanted to be the president’s national security adviser.[10] He had specified three goals to be achieved when he was in this office:[11]

1. Increase America’s ideological impact on the world.

2. Improve America’s strategic position, and that meant primarily in relationship to the Soviet Union.

3. Restore America’s appeal to the Third World.

The implementation of these goals was approached with extra intensity. Brzezinski did not neglect to indicate that he was a “naturalized American”[12] (of Polish origin), but in political terms, was “probably more intensely American than most.”[13]

One of Brzezinski’s favorite ways of resolving matters of dispute was to “bring some situations to a head be it in Southern Africa, or the Middle East, or even occasionally through confrontation with the Soviets.”[14]

Obviously, Brzezinski was not fond of Detente. From his point of view, Detente should be “reciprocal and comprehensive,”[15] which as far as he was concerned meant an American insistence on “equal treatment (retaliating if necessary) and that the Soviets could not have a free hand in some parts of the world while pursuing Detente where it suited them.”[16]

That view of Detente linked it with what Brzezinski called “responsible behavior”[17] from the Soviet Union.

Brzezinski considered Detente “incompatible with irresponsible [Soviet] behavior in Angola, the Middle East, and the UN.”[18] In the latter, he cited the example of the UN General Assembly Resolution equating Zionism with racism.

In his assessment of the character of his colleague, Cyrus Vance, Brzezinski said Vance had “an excessive faith that all issues can be resolved by compromise. Unfortunately, in a revolutionary age, such an approach, more often than not, tend to be exploited by the Qaddafis, Khomeinis, or even Brezhenevs or Begins of our age.”[19]

I would tend to suggest that Brzezinski exaggerated in this statement the ability of some Third World leaders to exploit Vance’s approach, even by the ‘likes’ of Qaddafi and Khomeini. I would even suggest that their ‘likes’ would be least capable of exploiting situations in a world basically divided into two camps led by two competing superpowers.

For example, Arab leaders, individually and collectively, failed to deter Egypt from seeking on its own a peaceful settlement which later culminated in the Camp David Accords and a peace treaty. Moreover, faith in solving problems by compromise was what produced the Accords not faith in using power. It was very unfortunate for peoples of the Third World countries to be the victims of Brzezinski’s views of their leaders or movements, and how and where they fit or do not fit in the competition with the Soviet Union.

Having been excluded from the peace process in the Middle East, the Soviet Union was, in a way, compensated for that exclusion by the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran, which, as indicated earlier, was going on more or less at the same time of working on reaching a settlement in the Middle East.

The fall of the Shah was a severe blow for the American strategic schemes, and would have been a devastating one to the grand designs of Brzezinski had the Islamic revolution in Iran been pro-Soviet. Despite the humiliation of the US at the hands of the new regime in Iran, the fact that it was equally anti-Soviet gave the US some comfort. This suggestion could be supported by the fact that Ronald Reagan, Carter’s successor, actually attempted to entice Iran. His attempt later developed into the Iran-Contra scandal.

Additionally, the Soviet Union in the 1970s was more assertive. It did not hesitate to invade Afghanistan in 1979.

After the loss of Iran and the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan, the Carter administration became nervous because it thought the oil supplies of the Gulf could be in danger. A new doctrine was, therefore, in order.

In his State of the Union address, on 23 January 1980, resident Carter said:[20]

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.[21]

According to Brzezinski, Carter’s Doctrine “was modeled on the Truman Doctrine,” and he, several times, “urged him [Carter] explicitly to emulate President Truman’s historic act.”[22] Although the Soviet Union was more assertive in the 1970s, I would argue that it could not have dared to try to “gain control the Persian Gulf” because it knew well the rules and limits of competing with the US for influence. Yet had it tried, force would have been used even if that Doctrine did not exist.

Therefore, I would consider Carter’s Doctrine gratuitous, but it might have been important for President Carter to sound tough after the loss of Iran and Afghanistan, especially at a time when his term was drawing to a close, and traditions required the president to have a doctrine, named after him.

To conclude this essay, it should be pointed out that excluding the Soviet Union from the peace process in the Middle East, and subsequently abandoning the goal of achieving multilateral, comprehensive peace, could be attributed to the following reasons:

1. Detente was an unwelcome business by many in the US.

2. Detente did not cover the Third World.

3. Absence of relations between Israel and the Soviet Union.

4. Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem.

Events in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world during the Carter administration would make me tend to agree with Fred Halliday that there was a second Cold War in the making when Carter was in office.[23] However, after the failed coup attempt in the Soviet Union and the ensuing rapid disintegration of the USSR, the Cold War was declared over (and won) by President Bush and many others. Therefore, if there was one Cold War, beginning in 1946 and ending in 1991, Fred Halliday would still be right in suggesting that under Carter, there was an escalation of tension between the superpowers[24] that would qualify it to be regarded as a second Cold War had the Soviet Union continued to exist.

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Notes

[1] Cyrus R. Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983) 164.

[2] Vance, p. 177. Vance suggested the following text to the PLO: The PLO accepts UN Security Council Resolution 242, with the reservation that it considers the resolution does not make adequate reference to the question of the Palestinians since it fails to make any reference to a homeland for the Palestinian people. It is recognized that the language of resolution 242 relates to the rights of all states in the Middle East to live in peace.

[3] Vance, Hard Choices, 164.

[4] Vance, Hard Choices, 164.

[5] Vance, Hard Choices, 164.

[6] Vance, Hard Choices, 164.

[7] Vance noted in his memoirs that the US foreign policy in the 1960’s and 70’s lacked “a broader American conception of US security interests and of the scope of our foreign policy than merely the US-Soviet or the East-West geopolitical competition.” (p. 23).

[8] Quoted by Seth P. Tillman, American Interests in the Middle East (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), 234.

[9] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), 87.

[10] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 4.

[11] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 3.

[12] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 20.

[13] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 20.

[14] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 43.

[15] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 147.

16] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 147.

[17] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 150.

[18] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 150.

[19] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 42.

[20] J. Carter, Keeping Faith (London: Collins, 1982), 483.

[21] The outside force Carter had in mind was the Soviet Union, of course. However, one could see now that choosing to neglect naming the Soviet Union would make the statement applicable to other ‘outside’ forces. Therefore, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and America’s reaction to it would fit very well into the scenario contained in the statement.

[22] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 443.

[23] Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War (London: Verso, 1983), 214.

[24] Halliday, Second Cold War, 1-3.