Jordan: A Democratic Audit
Representative and Accountable Government
Dr. Adli Hawwari
In this chapter, I present, analyse, and discuss the data pertaining to the second category in the democratic audit: representative and accountable government. It has six subcategories: free and fair elections; democratic role of political parties; government effectiveness and accountability; democratic effectiveness of parliament; civilian control of the military and police; and integrity in public life. The latter refers to corruption. As in the previous chapter, the overarching question is stated, marks are given, and then the analysis and discussion follow.
2.1 Free and Fair Elections
The overarching question (Q5S, Q33L) asks: ‘Do elections give the people control over the governments and their policies?’ All twenty-four respondents answered the question, with 0 being the lowest mark, and 7 the highest. The mean is 3.1.
The low marks by the respondents are not surprising. Since Jordan decided in 1989 to hold parliamentary elections, no government was formed as a result of the elections, or in line with the results. The largest party or a coalition of parties would not be offered the chance to form a government. The king retained the prerogative of appointing and dismissing the government. This remained so even after Abdullah II succeeded his father in 1999.
During the twenty years under assessment, six rounds of general elections were held: in 1989, 1993, 1997, 2003, 2007, and 2010. I shall outline below the outcome of each round, and to what extent, if any, it led to any degree of control over the government.
The elections of 1989 took place on 8 November. They were the first of their kind since 1967. There was a consensus amongst the people I interviewed in Jordan that the elections of 1989 were free and fair. This judgement, nonetheless, was not based on international standards of free and fair elections. However, the purpose here is not to challenge the characterization of the elections, but to establish the extent to which they led to control by the people over the government.
The MB gained twenty-two seats (out of eighty), constituting the biggest bloc in the HoD. The MB was not invited to form the government whether alone or in coalition with other parties. King Hussein named Mudar Badran as PM. When its formation was announced in December 1989, there were no MB ministers in it.
After the win, the MB issued a list of fourteen demands to join the government and give a vote of confidence. According to Gharaybeh (1997B, pp. 121-122), the list included demands such as working towards implementing Islamic law; amending the laws which contradict article 2 in the constitution (Islam is the religion of the State and Arabic is its official language); repealing the martial law within six months; and preventing the security forces from interfering in various sectors, including employment and scholarships to study abroad.
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and King Hussein’s attempt to find an Arab solution, Jordan strained its relations with Kuwait, the Gulf states, and Western countries. This situation required Jordan to present a united front. Hence, the MB was invited to join the government.
There was a reshuffle on 1 January 1991 which led to the inclusion of several ministers from the MB. Badran agreed to some of the demands referred to above, including the opening of a college for Islamic law at Yarmouk University, reinstating those who were sacked, and enacting some laws that partially met the demands of the MB (Gharaybeh 1997B, pp. 71-72).
Although this round of elections was considered free and fair, it did not lead to control by the people over the government. Three governments were formed between the elections of 1989 and 1993. None of them was under the control of the people through parties or MPs.
The elections of 1993 took place in November, more than a year after it became legal to form political parties. The elections were held under a new law known as the single vote law. During the elections of 1989, a constituent was able to vote for a number of candidates equal to the number of seats allocated for his or her constituency. If a constituency was allocated four seats, a voter would be able to vote for four candidates. This formula allowed people to widen their choices by not only voting for the candidate of the tribe. However, under the new law, a voter could only cast one vote in a multi-seat constituency. Faced with a single choice, a voter was pressurized into giving priority to the tribe’s candidate.
The consequence of this law was a reduction in the number of seats won by MB/IAF. However, despite the reduction, the number of seats was still considerable, given the fact that, as Robinson (1998) observed, the system was ‘clearly designed to work against their interests’ (p. 399). It is noteworthy that this round of elections took place while Jordan was still trying to repair its relations with the USA and the Gulf states. In 1993, the PLO reached an agreement with Israel which paved the way for Jordan to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1994.
The speed with which Jordan moved to sign the peace treaty and normalize relations with Israel was too fast even for those who were involved in the peace process such as Taher al-Masri. He and others opposed the Israeli participation in a trade fair held in Amman in 1996. Al-Masri suggested that in moving too fast, King Hussein was trying to compensate for the deterioration in the relationship with the USA over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.1
The MB/IAF and other smaller parties decided to boycott the elections of 1997 as a protest against the single vote law of 1993. The government considered the reason for the boycott unconvincing because in 1993 these parties took part in the elections, which were organized and carried out under the same law. Despite the dissatisfaction with the elections law in 1993, the MB/IAF participated in them. The leader of MB, Abdul-Rahman Khalifa, accepted the appeal of King Hussein for national unity.
The MB/IAF’s statement announcing the boycott was long, and it ended with seven demands: constitutional reforms; cancellation of the single vote law; cancellation of the provisional press law; stopping measures aiming at liquidating political parties and civil society organizations; economic reforms and fighting corruption; lifting restrictions on freedoms; and stopping the normalization of relations with Israel.
A round of elections was due in 2001. However, it was postponed for two years, and held on 17 June 2003. The number of deputies was increased from 80 to 110, six of which were reserved for women. The IAF participated in these elections and won seventeen seats.
The elections of 2007 were held on 23 November 2007—during the premiership of Maruf al-Bakhit, a former army general and a former ambassador to Israel. The IAF/MB nearly boycotted the elections. However, some assurances from al-Bakhit that the elections would be fair and free made them reconsider their position. The decision to participate did not meet the approval of all the leaders of IAF/MB.
The Secretary General of IAF, Zaki Bani Irshaid, chose not to join the campaign. This was used against him in subsequent internal disputes which led to the resignation of Bani Irshaid and the entire executive council in May 2009.
An interesting phenomenon that followed the elections was the analyses of the results. The columnist, Urayb al-Rintawi, (2007) saw the results as a sign that the Islamists have exhausted their appeal in Jordan and other Arab countries, such as Morocco. His analysis was unsound because it ignored the claims of rigging. Analysts should not base their analyses on dubious results. The fortunes of political parties change all the time.
Parties in power where free and fair elections take place come and go all the time. This applies to IAF as well. However, it is not possible to judge whether IAF is popular, and how popular, until fair and free elections are held.
The elections of 2010 were held under a new voting system, which was supposed to have alleviated the concerns of MB/IAF and others. However, the final version of the elections law retained the single vote in a multi-seat constituency. The MB/IAF and other parties boycotted these elections which were held during the premiership of Samir al-Refai.
In the long questionnaire, all six assessors answered the question. The marks given are 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, and 3. The mean is 2. The assessment in the long questionnaire confirms its counterpart in the short one. Although the mean is lower, there is no discrepancy that warrants an investigation into the difference.
2.2 Democratic Role of Political Parties
The overarching question (Q6S, Q39L) asks: ‘Does the political party system assist the working of democracy?’ All twenty-four respondents answered the question. The lowest mark given is 1; the highest is 10. The mean is 5, which is the same as the most frequent answer.
The elections of 1989 were held without the official presence of political parties. Nonetheless, candidates belonging to various parties, such as al-Ba‛th, ran in the elections. However, only one candidate won a seat. Fahd al-Rimawi, editor of al-Majd and a candidate at the time, attributed this to the fragmentation of votes. This might have been the case in a few seats, but overall, the failure was due more to the fact that the tides of these parties had receded long before the elections.
After the law of political parties came into force in 1992, there was a rush to form parties. Twenty parties applied for a licence. The government opposed the formation of some parties, refusing to license any party which it did not consider Jordanian. Parties belonging to, or affiliated with, Pan-Arab parties or Palestinian organizations had to change bylaws to meet the requirement of Jordanianness. This applied to the parties connected with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Ba‛th of Syria and Iraq. By the end of 1996, Jordan had twenty-three parties (Hourani 1997, p. 19).
Because of the high number of parties, and weak membership, King Abdullah II suggested the idea of having three to four major parties as a way of invigorating the political scene. However, al-Nsour (2005, pp. 120-121) considered the idea undemocratic without mentioning the king. He explained that although the US has two major parties, and the UK has three, there are many small parties in both courtiers. ‘To limit the number of parties’, he argues, ‘is an incorrect idea’. He calls for licensing all parties. The government, on the other hand, created a ministry for political development. Its tasks include developing strategies and programmes to ‘increase participation at all levels and in all fields’ such as local communities, parties, and trade unions.
In the long questionnaire, only two of the six assessors answered the question. The marks given are 0 and 2. The mean is 1. In view of the fact that four of the six assessors did not give a mark, and two gave low marks, it is highly likely that the decision to refrain from giving a mark reflects a high degree of scepticism in relation to the role of parties in assisting democracy in Jordan. The higher marks in the short questionnaire are likely to be due to the fact that some of the respondents are activists who belong to parties, and therefore took a more favourable view of their role (the parties), taking into consideration that they operate within restrictions imposed by the government.
2.3 Effective and Responsive Government
The overarching question (Q7S, Q46L) asks: ‘Is government effective in serving the public and responsive to its concerns?’ All twenty-four respondents answered the question. The lowest mark given is 1; the highest is 9. The mean is 5.3.
Jordan is a constitutional monarchy. However, the king is not a figurehead, as is the case in some European countries, such as Britain, Holland, and Norway. According to article 28 of the constitution, the monarchy is ‘hereditary’ and reserved for the ‘dynasty of King Abdullah ibn Hussein, in a direct line through his male heirs’.
Various articles in the constitution give the king the power to dissolve the HoD and HoN; he appoints and dismisses the prime minister; he is the supreme commander of land, naval, and air forces. The king is the executive branch, but according to the constitution, his power is exercised through ministers. However, he also has legislative power. According to article 25, the power to legislate is shared by the national assembly and the king, who is ‘immune from any liability and responsibility’, according to article 30
The prime minister in Jordan is selected by the king, and is instructed to form a government guided by a letter from the king. He also dismisses the government whenever he chooses. Only once in the history of Jordan had the chosen prime minister been a member of the party which gained the largest number of seats in the HoD. This was in October 1956. Sulayman al-Nabulsi’s government won the confidence of parliament. However, it was a short-lived government, serving less than six months. King Hussein dismissed him.
Considering that the elections do not give people control over the government and its policies, it will come as a surprise if the government was found to be effective and responsive to the concerns of the people. However, one has to outline why the respondents feel that the government is not responsive.
One of the characteristics of dealing with problems is to be in a state of denial, or to downplay the problem. Polluted water in the Mafraq, Irbid, and Jarash areas caused hundreds of cases diarrhoea and high temperature. Two ministers had to submit their resignations in the aftermath of the outbreak in the Mafraq area. An old network of pipes was blamed for the outbreak. Jordan is also known for limited water resources, which leads to restricting water supplies to homes on specific days of the week.
In 2007, there was an outbreak of food poisoning due to eating chicken shawarma, a popular meal sold at hundreds of restaurants throughout the country.2 The initial response was to downplay the extent of the problem. The government initially suggested that poisoning was limited to an area near Amman, and was due to selling shawarma before the meat was cooked at a sufficiently high temperature. However, after the number of cases exceeded 200, the government ordered a ban on selling chicken shawarma throughout the country.
Fahd al-Rimawi (2007) did not limit his criticism to the performance of the government in handling these and other problems. He widened the criticism to include the way governments were formed and how they were copies of each other, irrespective of who was selected as a prime minister. Legal proceedings were initiated in 2007 after this editorial. The charge was ‘insulting an official body’.
In the long questionnaire, four of the six assessors answered the question. The marks given are 1, 3, 3, and 5. The mean is 3. Refraining from giving a mark is likely to be indicative of scepticism about the responsiveness of the government. This was reinforced by the marks given by the four assessors who had answered the question.
2.4 Democratic Effectiveness of Parliament
The overarching question (Q8S, Q55L) asks: ‘Does the parliament or legislature contribute effectively to the democratic process?’ All twenty-four respondents answered the question. The lowest mark given is 0; the highest is 9. The mean is 4.7, which is close to the most frequent answer, 5.
Parliament, in theory, is the supreme body in democratic countries. It is one of the three branches of government and is part of the system of checks and balances. However, experiences vary from one country to another. In the UK, the PM and ministers are also MPs. In the US, the members of the House of Representatives are separate from the executive branch. Parliament can become docile and defer to the wishes of the president or PM. However, it can also assert its powers. In the USA, there have been two attempts at impeaching the president. In the UK, Parliament defied Tony Blair’s government in 2005 and rejected its Anti-Terror Bill which sought to increase the limit on detention of terror suspects without charge from fourteen days to ninety.
The official history of Jordan’s parliament shows that the HoD was dissolved several times, because it did not work well with the government. Contrary to the normal practice in democracies, the parliament is dismissed instead of the government. In other words, the legislative branch of government in Jordan is the weakest.
The marks above reflect dissatisfaction with the performance of the parliament. The HoD of 1989 and 1993 can be credited with some achievements, such as the lifting of martial law, and adopting a political parties law. One important episode is particularly noteworthy. During the speakership of Arabiyyat, the will of HoD prevailed when its views on a law were different from those of King Hussein.
Arabiyyat adhered to the first article in the constitution which states that Jordan’s ‘system of government is parliamentary with a hereditary monarchy’. In Arabiyyat’s view, this makes parliament’s power superior to the will of the king when both sides do not agree on a matter.3
As Arabiyyat pointed out, there was a difference of opinion concerning the law to make all the decisions of the state security court appealable. King Hussein sent the law back to the HoD, but under Arabiyyat’s leadership, the HoD adhered to its position. Subsequently, King Hussein relented and signed the law. As it reads now, article 9-C gives an automatic right of appeal for those sentenced to death and those with prison terms longer than ten years. The appeal must be referred to the Court of Appeal within thirty days, even if a defendant does not wish to appeal. The beneficiaries of this law were several people, amongst whom were some students at Mu’ta University (a military college), who were accused in 1993 of planning to kill King Hussein when he delivered a graduation speech.
A member of the Liberation Party, Yusef al-Sabatin, was amongst those who were accused of taking part in the plot. Al-Sabatin (n.d.) said, in his memoirs, he heard on radio a speech by King Hussein in which he mentioned the plot (p. 88). Later in the week, he read his name in a newspaper and realized that the plot had been fabricated because he had no involvement in it. In 1994, the state security court sentenced the students to death, but the sentences were commuted to life. The sentences of another three defendants, including al-Sabatin, remained the same (p. 90). In the meantime, the right of appeal had come into effect. When the appeal was considered, the entire case was dismissed. There was a period of seven years between the alleged plot and the decision to acquit the accused.
The most important weakness of the parliament is that it has no control over its fate. The king can, and did, dissolve it without warning or reason, as happened in November 2009. MPs tend to become intermediaries between the constituents and government officials and departments. The government takes advantage of the absence of parliament to enact provisional laws.
When the elections of 2001 were postponed, the government of Ali Abu al-Ragheb enacted 220 provisional laws. According to al-Hammouri (2005), the provisional laws are constitutionally allowed only when there are certain situations such as an earthquake or epidemic (pp. 75-85).
The HoD of 2007 was heavily criticized from all sides. Two writers who do not usually agree when writing about the same issue, Khalid Mahadin and Nahed Hattar, criticized the HoD. Hattar’s criticism was in terms that cost him his job as a cultural adviser at al-Ahli Bank.
Mahadin published an article pleading with King Abdullah II to dissolve the HoD, which did not endear itself to the public. Its Speaker, Abd al-Hadi al-Majali, initiated legal proceedings against Khalid Mahadin, but Mahadin won the case. A brother of an MP abused the official status given to his car and used it to smuggle drugs across the Syrian-Jordanian border.
Although the HoD of 2007 was the outcome of a heavily-rigged process, it is interesting to observe that the criticism was directed at the HoD and not at the system which allowed the rigging to take place. A more credible position would have been to dissolve parliament as one of many steps, including political reform, and to put on trial the officials who rigged the elections—charged with political fraud.
Moreover, I would argue that Jordan would have been better served by a lame parliament than by no parliament. Those who welcomed the decision to dissolve the HoD were short-sighted and not democrats. This proved to be the case when a new parliament was in place after the elections of 2010. When the government of Samir al-Refai asked for confidence of the HoD, it received 111 votes out of 120. Consequently, the HoD was the subject of ridicule for being submissive.
In the long questionnaire, the six assessors gave marks, but were less generous than their counterparts in the short one. The marks given are 1, 2, 2, 3, 5, and 8. The mean is 3.5. The mark of 8 is not consistent with the rest of the marks, and considering the evidence in relation to the effectiveness of the parliament, this single mark does not seem justified. Nonetheless, a more realistic appraisal has emerged as a result of the marks by the other assessors, and the collective assessment is similar to that of the short questionnaire.
2.5 Civilian Control of Military and Police
The overarching question (Q9S, Q60L) asks: ‘Are the military and police forces under civilian control?’ I anticipated that this was a question the respondents would not be comfortable with as the military, police, and the security services are another ‘red line’. The marks and frequencies were 0 (10); 1 (3); 2 (1); 3 (2); 6 (3); 8 (1); 9 (1); and 10 (10). The marks point to the confusion surrounding this question. The mark of 0 (zero) is meant to be a positive reply to the question. Therefore, it will be dishonest to suggest that the zero marks reflect a negative view of the issue of the question.
In one way, the question was easy to answer in relation to Jordan. The king is the supreme commander of the army. The defence minister in Jordan is a civilian, often the prime minister. Therefore, there is no issue in terms of the control of the army. It would be naïve of those who devised the democratic audit to have assumed that civilian control of the army and military produces a satisfactory situation. Therefore, one has to look further than who is in control.
According to Glubb (1948), the creation of the Jordanian army (the Arab legion) dates back to 1920, when it was formed by the British officer, Fredrik Peake. It started with 100 servicemen, and was increased to 1,000 in 1921. Glubb himself became the commander of the Jordanian army for two decades (1936-1956). Glubb was dismissed by King Hussein in 1956 in a move that was popular in Jordan, and referred to as the Arabization of the army.
The Jordanian army has its accolades. In 1948, it was able to keep East Jerusalem in Arab hands. In March 1968, it dealt the Israeli forces a severe blow in the battle of al-Karameh, which occurred soon after the defeat of 1967.4 Some of the Israeli tanks were left on the battlefield and were put in the public square near the municipality of Amman.
The police force in Jordan was part of the army and remained so until 1956 when it was assigned its own commander, Bahjat Tayyara. In 1958, it became an independent force under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior. A law was enacted in 1965 to regulate the police force and delineate its tasks and responsibilities.
In 2008, a new police force was created. To distinguish it from the regular police, it was given the name ‘darak’. Members of this force were deployed in cases of protests against the Israeli embassy in Amman during the war on the Gaza Strip in December 2008. They were also deployed to deal with a strike by workers at the Port of Aqaba. The darak forces are often deployed to keep the peace between feuding tribes, particularly after the murder of one member by another tribe’s member. The common factor in these situations is the use of excessive force.
The overarching question in this subcategory does not mention other security corps, namely the intelligence services. I propose to include them in this subcategory. My focus will be on the GID.
The GID was created in 1964. It has its own ranks, and its head is a general. For many years, the head of GID was a Palestinian, Muhammad Rasul al-Kilani. During this time, the headquarters of GID was euphemistically referred to as the hotel of Abu Rasul.
The role of GID is not limited to intelligence gathering or counter-intelligence. The role and influence affect the lives of Jordanians in many ways, including the ability to gain employment in the public sector. The practice of confiscating passports was widespread. It is used as a means to control a citizen’s ability to travel.
The GID has the power to arrest individuals and hold them in its own prisons. When a person is arrested by the GID, he or she can be held up to six months without being charged. During this time, the arrested person cannot have access to a lawyer. Family members may be allowed to visit him or her. In 2008, HRW released a report which said the torture was still ‘widespread and routine in Jordan’s prisons’ (p. 1). The report identified the means of torturer (p. 2):
Most common forms of torture include beatings with cables and sticks and the suspension by the wrists of inmates from metal grates for hours at a time. Guards flog the defenseless prisoner with knotted electrical cables, beat him with hoses and truncheons, or kick him with fists and boots.
In 2006, Amnesty International (AI) described Jordan as ‘key hub in secret CIA programme’ to torture terror suspects outside the USA.
There is no committee to oversee the intelligence services. Although even in Western countries, intelligence services are given extensive powers, and intelligence matters are not discussed in public, the presence of an overseeing committee is necessary even if it is not a very effective safeguard. A committee may be able to ensure that intelligence departments do not operate without control, as secrecy is an open invitation to corruption and abuse of power.
In the long questionnaire, five of the six assessors gave marks with a majority being low. The marks given are 0, 0, 2, 5, and 9. The mean is 3.2. I reiterate my earlier suggestion that the data related to this question should be considered unreliable.
To conclude the discussion of this question, I should restate the fact that the king is the supreme commander of the army. The defence minister, usually a civilian, is nominally in charge of the army. This question should be revised by IDEA to include the security services, as a strict answer to the question will not include the intelligence services.
2.6 Integrity in Public Life
The overarching question (Q10S, Q66L) asks: ‘Is the integrity of conduct in public life assured?’ Twenty-three respondents answered the questions. The lowest mark given is 1; the highest is 8. Notable here is the absence of any 10. The mean is 3.8.
Allegations of corruption are rife in Jordan, and get mentioned frequently in the press and by politicians of the opposition. There is now a department in Jordan whose responsibility is to fight corruption. In 2005, King Abdullah II instructed the Prime Minister, Adnan Badran, to establish an independent department to fight corruption. A law was enacted for this purpose. The new department was ready to begin its work in August 2008. The acts that come within the definition of corruption include embezzlement, bribes, and exploiting position for material and other benefits.
Although allegations of corruption are widespread, they sometimes prove unfounded when the cases are brought to trial. For instance, five high-ranking officials in government departments and a bank were brought to trial in 2002. The allegations were related to a deal to buy rubbish collection equipment. The trial was concluded only in 2008 and they were found not guilty.
Transparency International (TI) ranked Jordan at 49 out of 180 states. The mark given to Jordan was 5 out of 10. In comparison with other states in the Arab world, Jordan was fifth. As the Head of the of Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), Abd al-Shakhanbeh, explains: ‘the rank in relation to other Arab states is good, considering the fact that the other states ahead of Jordan are rich’.5 The implication that rich states do better at fighting corruption, or there are fewer incentives for people in rich states to engage in corruption, is not necessarily correct.
While the government tries to demonstrate a level of seriousness concerning the fight against corruption, there is often a reminder to people of the need to protect reputations from unfounded allegations. However, this kind of reminder is interpreted as lack of resolve.
In the long questionnaire, all of the six assessors answered the question. The marks given are 1, 1, 3, 5, 5, and 8. The mean is 3.8, which is similar to that of the short questionnaire.
How widespread is corruption? What levels in the state does it reach? Laith Shbailat goes further than anyone else in Jordan. He suggests that corruption has reached the royal court. A Lebanese TV channel, al-Jadid, aired a long interview with Shbailat in February 2011. There were references in the programme to the lavish lifestyle of Queen Rania as indicative of corruption. One of the examples cited as an indication of corruption reaching the royal court was the decision by the government of Ali Abu al-Ragheb in 2001 to register hundreds of dunams of state land in the name of King Abdullah II. In a television interview in April 2011, Abu al-Ragheb said he did so after receiving a letter from the royal court. He further said he acted lawfully.
In December 2011, the Jordanian a news agency, Petra, reported that two officials from the royal court, its head Riyad Abu Karaki and media adviser Amjad al-Adayleh, met the editors of the daily newspapers and others to reveal the facts of the land registration. The royal court acknowledged that during 2000-2003 some land (4827 dunams) was registered in King Abdullah’s name. Most of it is outside Amman and earmarked for development. Ownership of some of the land was transferred from the king to the armed forces and to the municipality of Amman. The two officials said this process would continue, as the purpose was to expedite decisions of developing the pieces of land in question.
Jordan’s fight against corruption needs to widen its scope to include practices which do not come within the official definition of corruption. For example, in 2008, the government decided to exempt MPs from customs duty on new cars. Other practices include allocating cars to ministers and other people in senior posts to be used for private purposes such as taking children to school. These practices encourage a culture of taking advantage of posts, and deepen the gap between the haves and the have-nots.
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(1) Personal interview. Amman, 4 January 2009.
(2) The vast majority of restaurants are small shops either with a few seats or sell food ‘to go’.
(3) Personal interview. Amman, 7 June 2009.
(4) Palestinian resistance fighters, who were the intended target of the Israeli army, took part in this battle which made Fatah the most popular organization.
(5) Personal interview. Amman, 25 March 2010.
Adli Hawwari (2020). Reluctant Liberalisation: A Democratic Audit of Jordan, 1989-2019. London: Ud Al -Nad Ltd.
- Jordan: A Democratic Audit